Iraqi equipment has worked in the beginning for two to three days. Gulf war gave a demonstration of the power of EW and it is a watershed in the history of war. It is clear that unless we have mastery in the field of EW, our very survival is threatened. Strategic electronics playa vital role in survival. An analysis of strategic electronics and strategy to survive are presented in this communication.
When we consider where we are, which way we are heading and which way we intend to go, it is essential that we remember the words of the first strategist, Napoleon who said. "he who does not read history is condemned to repeat it". In UK, important military studies are conducted and reported in a journal by Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). According to its perception, all nations are caught in 'Technology Trap.t.2. The U S call it by a different name, Calvin Coolidge Syndrome3. Figure I illustrates the technology trap. The dots show the cost of a single US aircraft from the time of concept through prototype, evaluation and induction into service. This is shown against GNP and the Defence budget of the corresponding period. The early aircraft was made using wooden frame. tin sheet, and piano wire to control. During World War II the escalation in cost is evident, as it is quickly realised that an aircraft is a war winning machine. ( impending equipment demands, information overload, and physically bear up the 'G' forces. The point may be round the corner to return to less sophisticated lower performance fighters that are more compatible with their human drivers, and put more performance into weapons.
TECHNOLOGY TRAP

THE TECHNOLOGY
There appears to be a lack of appreciation of the timelag between concept and product, even in the minds of the people connected with Defence, not to mention the public at large. Two factors related to technology are critical, and need to be appreciated. More so, as technology is accused of always delivering less, arriving late, and costing too much.
New technology and capabilities are limited by the vulnerabilities that they carry with them. Let us take a simple case to illustrate the point. From the days of Vikings and Phoenecians, sailboats were both the means of travel as well as war winning machines. Attached with a long shaft in the front, the technique of warfare used to be to ram into the enemy ships, board the vessel and combat. The fuel is free and as long as well charted coastline is in sight, long distance travel was possible limited only by the strength of the oarsmen aboard and the cannibals ashore. Come the steam engine, navigation and Naval warfare has changed. Steam engine, combined with age old Archimedes screw used as propeller, gave the ship independence from the vagaries of the weather and wind, gave speed and manoeuvrability to run, re-group and attack. This rosy picture carried with it the penalty that the ship had to carry its own fuel, and hence the range of operation was limited by the fuel and rations it could carry. The routes were tied to fuel supply lines and these needed to be defended. Soon followed colonisation for the coal and mineral mines were not near the ports. To maintain the co,lonies, militar:y stepped in. Larger ships with ow.n fuel and army needed larger displacement, resulting in larger decks where larger guns can be mounted to fire at enemy shIps at farther ranges. For self protection against enemy attack, thicker arm our plates were needed leading again to larger displacement and more space to keep bigger guns. Science takes no sides. Nations driven by politico-economic considerations engage intellectuals to engineer the physical phenomena and materials to build weapons systems to win a war. A model of war winn.inb technology is presented in Fig. 3 . Of a number of such engineered versions, one becomes a decisive weapon that wins the war. Immediately; all countries -acquire them in quantity and add to their inventory .Here we are confronted with a dilemma. Of the plethora of opportunities that science offers, how can we predict which is war winning technology? If the limited resources are invested in all promosing areas, they are spread too thinly to be effective. On the other hand, if we are choosy, we might just miss the right technology. We are aware that Patriot missile was given up as no good, and yet it saved the day in Gulf War. The adversary may capitalise on it, make a countermeasure and make the weapon totally ineffective. This is a continuous cycle during war and peace times. It is usually during wartime, until now, that human ingenuity, and heroic acts could be traced and eulogised. It is now being shifted from the battlefield to the laboratories, where many a hero retires unsung.
It may also be seen that inventory never won a war , it only kept the war going. It is human ingenuity and innovation that decides the winner; this is war winning be viewed with scepticism, discussed (if at all), and discarded as futile as it is already in public domain. The minority who use the concept and adopt it to the situation may win the war. If it is not published but aired iii'private, it will not be accepted because it is not published.
Be that as it may, I hazard an illustration: we have a priori knowledge that, (i) a fly's eye has a lens that senses a movement though an exact image is not formed-an aspect of image processing, (ii) through fuzzy logic, we can handle uncertainty, approximate and qualitative information to arrive at a fairly accurate conclusion, and (iii) we can build, and train a neural network to learn and adapt to an environment, recognise objects, etc.
We can now conceive of putting together a cluster of infrared sensors with fly's eye lens that sense movement, and radiate the information regarding the movement in a small range to a local receiver. The local receivers form a cell and a neural network can be trained to locate, identify , and track a threat day or night. The central command post can decide the course of action. Each sensor is so small that it is difficult to locate and identify. A number of them are distributed randomly so that loss of a few do not lead to catastrophic failure of the system but ensure graceful degradation. Nor will the capture of a few devices let the secret of the system out. The entire system is disposable as their capture does n<?t affect use of the same system elsewhere. Since the number required is large, it can be made very economical through. mass production. The same production line can be used for civilian purposes where each individual infrared detector can be used as intruder alarm in residences, offices, etc. They can be used for personal safety in hazardous areas. A. plethora of applications can be conceived as human ingenuity is unbounded.
In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment and with rapid strides in science and techno! -oJ, it is presumptious to recommend a long term strategy. At the same time, due to the long gestation period of development cycle and life of weapons systems, it is necessary to have a long term plan, however fle~ible. 
